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Poltieke economie
The debates on the operational method and 
the regularity of capitalism usually brisk up 
in crisis periods. And since in the previous 
years several illusions have existed on the 
possibility of the crisisless development of 
capitalism (e.g. the neoliberal general equi-
librium concept, the vision of the infor-
mation society capable of ruling itself, the 
concept of the „new economy” absolutising 
the opportunities of technical and produc-
tivity development during the long lasting 
boom of the ’90s, etc.), the crisis itself and 
the organic laws of movement were hardly 
dealt with. Economic thinking was domina-
ted by micro-economic approaches of busi-
ness respect, and the interpretation of the 
macro-economic processes was based on 
the supply-demand models elaborated for 
company-bank management. And these are 
short or perhaps medium term models hard-
ly capable of considering the complex na-
ture and long term fluctuation of the natio-
nal economic (and societal) processes, not 
speaking of the complicated interconnec-
tions of the globalizing world. The repre-
sentatives of the political economic ap-
proach (some of them will be mentioned la-
ter) were pushed into the background both 
in the literature and the economic life. And 
in Hungary, the neo-liberal economic way 
of thinking is still, even under the present 
depressive circumstances, stronger than it 
is in the West, where several university de-
partments of Keynesian and even Marxist 
view have been operating over the previous 
decades, and the neoliberal principles of 
minimal state contribution and economic 
incitement have been stepped over as a re-
sult of the present global crisis. In Hunga-
ry, the leftist and rightist economists, hand 
in hand in the Reform Alliance, announced 
a restrictive program which is one sidedly 
based on neoliberal principles, deepens the 
crisis and raises social contradictions.    
A new generation of economists has grown 
up who, although have learnt about non-
liberal (conservative, in a political sense) 
ideological trends and interpretations of 
capitalism, consider these as archaic, and 
in fact are very little informed on the theo-
retical system of these. I have made the fol-
lowing analysis within the frameworks of a 
professional debate, partly in order to make 
the young colleagues get acquainted with 
that a sort of political economic view. This 
work is a brief, sketch-like summary of a 
more or less didactic nature also explaining 
basic terms.
Crisis and theory
The economic depressions have been ana-
lyzed many times in the history of econo-
mics. Here I only mention some of the most 
important ones. 
Of the early theoretical economists, Jean-
Charles-Leonard Sismondi (1773-1842), 
for example, was clearly aware of the fact 
that the machines supersede human from 
production, the working class falls into 
poverty which results in the contradiction 
between production and the insufficiency of 
demand. Therefore Sismondi thought that 
crises are inevitable and that they are eased 
only by the existence of the small produ-
cers, not the capitalist markets. Thomas 
Malthus (1766-1834) was also of the opi-
nion that over-production is typical of ca-
pitalism. He said that the capitalists do not 
spend enough, and the workers are unable 
to spend enough to make the demand adapt 
to the pace dictated by accumulation. Ac-
cording to Malthus, surplus can be drained 
by the existence of the “non-producing 
consumers’” class (aristocrats, priests and 
state buraeucracy). (At the same time – ac-
tually contradicting his previous thought –, 
in his famous thesis he emphasized food 
shortages, and demanded the increase of 
population to be stopped at any price.) At 
the beginning of the 19th century, owing to 
the spread of the Say dogma – this says that 
total supply always creates its own demand 
–, the possibility of a crisis was considered 
partial and temporal. The French Clément 
Juglar (1819-1905) was the first to make 
time series analyses, and relying on these 
he mentioned investment periods of 7-11 
years long that depended on prosperity and 
hided in the background of trade depres-
sions. In our days, Karl Marx (1818-1883) 
is regularly referred to in crisis interpreta-
tions. Marx’s set of thoughts most referred 
to is the one saying that in production the 
proportion of the production tools necessa-
rily (and at a growing extent in the globa-
lization process) increases to the detriment 
of the labour force creating the new value 
(the organic composition of production 
grows), therefore the profit rate shows a de-
clining tendency (which must continuously 
be counterbalanced by new methods) on 
one hand, and the demand is insufficient on 
the other. During the time of a good boom, 
the contradictions accumulate in a latent 
way, and burst to the surface suddenly. 
And the periodicity of the crises is a con-
sequence of the contemporary mass rene-
wal of the capital assets. Marx, however, in 
his deeper theoretical approach, attributes 
the depression to the basic contradiction of 
capitalism, the antagonism lying between 
the societal nature (organization) of pro-
duction and the individual dispossession of 
the results of production (private property). 
This is the basic root of the contradiction 
between the organized nature of produc-
tion and the anarchic nature of the market, 
and the contradiction of production and 
The present crisis is not 
merely financial, nor only over-
production, but a kind of node 
crisis of global capitalism.
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insufficient demand. Josef Alois Schum-
peter (1883-1950) related the crises to the 
periodicity of the introduction of new tech-
nical developments into production and the 
cyclic nature of innovations. He empha-
sized the positive side of the crises, that is 
the creation of the conditions necessary for 
the boom period meaning a new technolo-
gical level, the “creative destruction”. Ac-
cording to Nikolai Kondratieff (1892-1932) 
and his followers, the adoption of certain 
technical inventions of great importance 
and the amortization and the supplement of 
these (partly the international flow of fac-
tors and within that the international flow 
of capital and labour force migration) de-
signate big cycles of 50-60 years that are 
divided into an emerging (A) and a des-
cending (B) phase. Analyzing the Ameri-
can economy, Simon Kuznets (1901-1985) 
found that economic crises occur every 
15-20 years, and explained these prima-
rily by the cyclic nature of infrastructural 
investments.  According to John Kenneth 
Galbraith (1908-2006), over-production is 
a consequence of the monopolist character 
of the economy. The depressions may be 
prevented by economic planning and an in-
crease in state contribution. He also wrote 
a book on the history of financial specula-
tions. Paul Samuelson (1915-2009), in his 
Economics studied by several generations, 
considered the crises as immanent elements 
of capitalism. In the early editions he de-
scribed in details for example the extreme-
ly short-term and profit hunting psychosis 
which leads, in today’s term, to the deve-
lopment of bubbles. This part, however, 
was removed from the text of the editions 
published from the ’60s. According to Sa-
muelson, Roy Forbes Harrod (1900-1978) 
and John Richard Hicks (1904-1989), the 
Keynesian multiplicator and accelerator 
effect (and the retarded impacts of these) 
may divert economic growth from the equi-
librium path. John Maynard Keynes (1883-
1946) himself dealt with the possibility of 
crises, but in his general theory he consi-
dered them avoidable by an anti-cyclic 
state economic policy and its multiplicator 
effect.
In addition to the disequilibrium models 
of crisis explanations introduced above, 
there is another trend which places the 
focus at the anomalies of financial and fis-
cal processes. According to Johan Gustav 
Wiksel (1851-1926) and Friedrich Hayek 
(1889-1992), over-production is the conse-
quence of over-capitalization. In his early 
book Paul Krugman (1953- ) wrote that 
the economic stakeholders keep govern-
mental over-spending unsustainable. They 
expect the government to fill in the deficit 
by deficit financing and selling currency. 
The previous causes inflation, and the lat-
ter one may end in currency speculation 
which finally leads to imbalance. Nouriel 
Roubini (1958- ), who is the most known 
“predictor” of the present global world eco-
nomic crisis in the US, explains the effects 
of financial and real economic processes in 
their interrelation.
The nature and history of crises
Economic cycles and within this crises are 
the natural phenomena of the operation of 
capitalism. The first over-production crisis 
broke out in England in 1825. The first real 
world economic depression burst one and 
a half century ago, in 1847 (partly giving 
ground to the revolutions of 1848). The 
economic business cycles are generally of 
7-10 years long. 
At the beginning of the bustle and boom 
classic economic cycle, also because of 
competition, new production increasing 
technology is introduced (intensive phase), 
and new production capacities are created 
as a result of the good conjuncture (de-
mand), and later the production bases are 
extended at the level of the existing tech-
nology (extensive phase). Production flies 
high on one hand, and so are the prices 
of the stock exchanges and the securities. 
After some time, the capital – its financial 
and producing forms, too – become “over-
accumulated” from the profits of the boom 
incomes. The financial, exchange and 
production-service (capacity) “bubbles” 
come to life. Competing in production and 
services keeps growing, over-production 
(or rather over-capacity these days) starts, 
and technology becomes more and more a 
substituted for value making labour force 
(press on wages). Supply is not followed 
by solvent demand (neither on the market 
of products, nor on that of securities later). 
At the end of the boom the profits start de-
creasing. The crisis, which appears at the 
surface as the loss of confidence, arrives 
(“the bubbles burst”). In the depression 
period a considerable capital loss (deva-
luation) takes place. The stock exchanges, 
the share prices, the prices of the real es-
tates and the securities substituting for real 
estates and serving speculation (only PC 
data today) fall, production capacities are 
closed, high numbers of less competitive 
(mainly smaller) producers go bankrupt, 
and the goods on stock are put on sale or 
eliminated After the surplus securities not 
covered by any realia have become devalu-
ated and the surplus capacities disappeared, 
the equilibrium slowly becomes restored, 
and the possibility of starting a new cycle 
is created. (This is why Schumpeter called 
the crisis a “creative destruction”.) Upturn 
often begins after some months of a depres-
sion (stagnation or slow development) pe-
riod again.
The deepest global crises are at the same 
time daybreaks in the history of capitalism 
(they are more than just cyclic crises). The 
declining tendency of the profit rate, which 
is typical of capitalism and accelerates in 
crisis periods, must partly be counterba-
lanced by a new operational method. The 
node crisis means that capitalism is una-
ble to operate the earlier ways, or it must 
renew its ways of operation (see Rozsnyai 
1994). The depressions that are less deep, 
and do not reach each of the sectors and 
economic fields are also called medial or 
intervallic crises.
There was a nod crisis going on from 1873 
during which capital concentration accele-
rated, and the capitalism directed by eco-
nomic-financial monopolies was born. The 
Great Depression of 1929-33 confirmed 
state intervention (the prototypes of which 
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appeared already in the war economy of 
World War I). The evolution of neoliberal 
capitalism directed by transnational com-
panies, and so the completing globaliza-
tion of the economic relations started with 
the crisis in 1974. 
The node crises are more or less connec-
ted to one or another industrial revolution. 
The crisis in 1847 was preceded by the 
introduction of steam engines, and was 
followed by the rapid development of the 
means of transportation and the building 
of railway lines. After the 1870s mass pro-
duction started on the base of the new re-
sults of physics (electricity) and chemistry 
which made (in parallel with the sharpe-
ning of market competition, that is the fight 
for realizable profits) the concentration of 
capital in big production units, the mono-
polies, necessary. The Great Depression of 
1929-33 was preceded by over-production 
also connected to belt-system production, 
and then recovery became possible partly 
with the help of the war industry boom 
preparing the new war. After World War 
II, the most important traction sectors were 
oil-chemical industry and car production. 
After 1974 it was the micro-electronic, te-
lecommunication and transportation revo-
lution that made the recovery and globali-
zation itself possible. 
Across the development history of ca-
pitalism the basic nature of the crises 
remained, but their characteristics have 
changed a lot. In some cases not all of 
the developed countries got into a reces-
sion at one time, so they “rescued” each 
other. The state interventionist Keynesian 
anti-cyclic economic policy decreased the 
amplitude of the cycles at a considerable 
degree after World War II, however, trade 
fluctuations became some more frequent in 
the ’60s and ’70s. Earlier, it was the colo-
nial system, today it is modern economic 
dependence and the debt problem which in 
many cases allow the shifting and sprea-
ding of the crisis phenomena upon the less 
developed and the developing countries, 
e.g. during the regional financial crises 
between 1997 and 2000 (making them in-
debted, speculative capital movements, 
displacement of existing production lines, 
etc., see Artner 2006, pp. 165-171.) 
The pecularities of transnatio-
nal capitalism (globalization)
The nature of the present world economic 
crisis (several of its peculiarities) origina-
tes in some of the important characteristics 
of transnational capitalism and those of the 
globalization era. These latter ones are as 
follows. 
1. The evolution of a financial balloon of 
never ever seen size. After the crisis in 
1974 the displacement and rescue of the 
over-accumulated capitals (gained from in-
ternational transactions and also appearing 
in high raw material prices) that were con-
demned “written off” within the national 
frameworks during the previous crisis pe-
riods started (indebtment of the developing 
and the then socialist countries through 
temporarily negative interests and produc-
tion displacement). This was supplemented 
by the becoming of currency speculation 
general and later the introduction of deriva-
tive (speculative financial) means. In 2008 
speculative cash flow amounted to 24 times 
as much as the global GDP (own calcula-
tion relying on the statistics of the Bank for 
International Settlements). The total cash 
flow (the previous ones + bank credits and 
their instalments, direct investments, wage 
and profit transfers, foreign trade paymen-
ts, etc.) reached almost hundred times as 
much as the world trade. Owing to this, the 
exchanges soared (in 1929 the capitaliza-
tion of the New York Exchange amounted 
to 80 percent of the American GDP, and to 
160-180 percent in the first decade of the 
new millennium – see: the various data of 
the World Development Indicators). The 
power of financial capital is more enor-
mous than it was in the earlier phases of 
capitalism, and financial capital and pro-
ducing capital are directly intertwined (e.g. 
of the 13 branches of General Electric the 
financial one is the far most profitable; the 
pension funds and venture funds finance 
production investments; the big companies, 
like Volkswagen, conduct huge transac-
tions on the speculative money markets). 
It clearly shows the power of financial 
capital that the money investment, that is 
speculative, incomes – first in the history of 
capitalism – have become higher than that 
of production capital. This encumbered the 
financing of production activities and the 
states of decreasing incomes. 
2. Driven by competition and adopting to 
the demands of global production organi-
zation (and allowed by the informatics, te-
lecommunication and transportation revo-
lution), transnational companies (TNCs), 
or producing-financial conglomerates that 
are of much bigger size and financial mus-
cle than the former monopolies, and co-
operate and compete at the same time, have 
evolved (fusions and buy-outs). 
3. The global liberalization and completion 
of economic contacts (including the out-
standingly important ownership relations) 
resulted primarily in the displacement of 
labour intensive production to the rising 
countries offering good conditions (mainly 
to a dozen countries, first of all China). So 
the extensive and the intensive phase of the 
economic cycle “have been placed side to 
side” in the global scope: the technical-pro-
duction tools condemned to be discarded 
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are kept in operation in the low-wage coun-
tries (in the form of direct investments), 
while technological renewal has become 
permanent in the developed countries, e.g. 
in electronics (see Rozsnyai 2002, pp. 88-
89). In the hierarchy of the capitalist cen-
tre, the semi-periphery and the periphery 
production cycles (also depending on glo-
bal processes) of the country groups and 
regions unite in a global cycle not always 
synchronistic but subjected to the deve-
loped countries in complicated intercon-
nections. According to Tamás Szentes, the 
global nature of the present crisis proves 
the “only and organic nature of world eco-
nomy”, including the trade, the technolo-
gical, the creditor, etc. inequalities and the 
asymmetries of international ownership 
relations (italics in the original text, Szen-
tes 2009, p. 62 and pp. 111-147). Not even 
China can escape from the impacts of the 
present crisis (since the most of its indus-
trial production and its export is provided 
by the TNCs). 
4. Production displacement serves and con-
tributes to the global capacity over-accu-
mulation. In the developed countries both 
state policy and the trade unions are bra-
king capacity reductions, or at least their 
final termination. Surplus production capa-
cities highly exceeding those of the former 
times have evolved. One third of the global 
capacities remained unused in car industry 
traditionally, and in steel industry and buil-
ding material industry after the millenary, 
and the situation is very similar in electro-
nic industry (where these capacities disap-
peared at the beginning of our decade, after 
the informatics bubble had burst out).  The 
maintenance of the surplus capacities was 
made possible by the enormous financial 
muscle and money market extra profits of 
the TNCs.   
5. Production displacement results in the 
increased global competition of the wor-
kers (and countries) and so the reduction 
of wage costs and social benefits. Primarily 
in the developing countries, technology 
supersedes human from production, but 
industrial employment has been stagnating 
since the late ’90s in the rising countries, 
as well. Actually, the real wages have been 
stagnant in the developed countries during 
the previous two decades, and considerably 
fell in the USA in the 1990s. The propor-
tion of the capital incomes in the GDP is 
growing to the detriment of work incomes 
worldwide (this has very much contributed 
to the sustainability of the profit rates and 
the lengthening of the economic cycles). 
The weakening of consumer demand (and 
consumer savings) was overbridged by 
consumption inciting credit dumping (see 
Szalai 2006, pp. 35-36). 
6. Thus credit market, the stock of debts, 
has swollen enormous. The decrease in the 
real economy incomes (compared to the fi-
nancial incomes) and the lack of demand – 
not only in the case of the population – was 
surmounted by growing credits during the 
previous decades. Loans and the increa-
se in the stock of debts were used to
 a./ counterbalance the stagnation or decrea-
se in the population’s work and other in-
comes were; b./ finance the production less 
profitable as compared to money incomes; 
c./ counterbalance the governmental inco-
mes narrowing as a result of neoliberal po-
licy. The data is terrifying: according to the 
bank of banks, the Bank of International 
Settlements in Basel, the banks and other 
financial institutions of the world kept USD 
585 trillion debt (credit loan) registered in 
2008, which is ten times as much as the 
world’s annual GDP! 
7. Globalization allowed the evolution of 
much bigger international trade and pay-
ment balance disequilibrium than the for-
mer phases of the world economy did (Far-
kas 2002, pp. 142-144). The outstandingly 
high, 6-7 percent deficit, which is predicted 
to be 8 percent in 2009, and is unsustai-
nable in the long run, was and is financed 
by the rest of the regions, including Africa 
(“perverse capital flow”). 
8. The theory of the percolation of wealth 
has not proved to be true: the income diffe-
rences grew further within and between the 
countries which has caused serious social 
tensions. In the seventies, the difference in 
the average GDP per capita between the 
developed and the developing countries 
was 19 times as much, today it is at least 25 
times as much. The difference between the 
end values is 80 times as much. According 
to the OECD, there are hardly more than 4 
or 5 countries where the domestic income 
differences (measured with the Gini coef-
ficient) has not grown between the “upper” 
and “lower” social groups over the previ-
ous decades (OECD online). Although as a 
result of China’s development, the number 
of those definitely underfed has decreased 
by 2-300 million during the previous de-
cade, the present crisis has already “over-
compensated” for this, and the number of 
the starving people has grown by 3-400 
million (not in China). So today 1.2 billion 
human beings are starving! 
Thus globalization allowed imbalances of 
never ever seen sizes both at the national 
and the international level. The transna-
tional capitalist (globalization) system – 
although it had some medial cyclic crises 
at the beginning of the ‘80s, the ‘90s and 
our decade –, kept the problems rolling 
forward, and the tensions, not even hidden 
in most fields, have been continuously  ac-
cumulating through 30 years (see more de-
tails: Farkas 2002, pp. 107-185). 
In order to keep this rolling sustained and 
to prevent an even bigger crisis, primarily 
the USA – contradictory to the neoliberal 
principles (of the Washington Consen-
sus ensuring the opening of markets for 
the strong ones) officially announced and 
called to account upon other countries – 
applied a policy mix, and within that anti-
cyclic demand inciting and liquidity crea-
ting means, sometimes even protectionism, 
mainly between 2000 and 2002 (e.g. the 
governmental economy incentive package 
of USD 150 billion, the increase in money 
amount /M2/ exceeding 10 percent or the 
raise in steel industry duties). The low level 
of the interbank rate (its permanent reduc-
tion to 1 percent after 2002) and the credit 
dump creating demand were the means of 
economy incentive, as well. So the Keyne-
sian economy incentive steps made by the 
US in the present crisis (bank rescuing pac-
kages, creation of liquidity, that is partly 
[bankóprés], production inciting and work-
place creating activity, public works, etc.) 
are not without preliminaries. 
The general characteristics of 
the present crisis
The present serious and at the same time 
node crisis is the consequence of epochal 
economic processes clearly describable 
according to the above. The bigger the 
tensions in a system grow, the more pro-
bable it is that it will be broken apart by 
the internal powers. From the middle of 
the ’90s, for example Thurow, in one case 
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Greenspan and then Soros, Krugman, 
Stiglitz, Wallerstein and many other, and in 
the previous years even the IMF warned us 
of the danger of a great crisis. 
The present crisis has general peculiari-
ties connected to the classic crisis process. 
Paul Samuelson said that: “The present si-
tuation is very similar to the (Great – P.F.) 
Depression, and in some fields, the pro-
perty market, for example, the conditions 
are even worse” (Prior to 2012… HVG 
(Weekly World Economy), Jan. 24., 2009, 
p. 8.). So contrary to all other rumours (and 
expectations) the present crisis is not me-
rely a property market crisis (as it has been 
clear since at least the autumn of 2007, the 
first bank problems). Contrary to all the 
earlier rumours, this recession has proved 
to be more than a credit market crisis, and 
it has not only caused the general depres-
sion of the money markets. The simple fact 
is that the crisis, after the property bubble 
had burst out, found its way through to the 
financial and exchange processes just as it 
had done in 1929. The present crisis is a 
“general” over-production (and profit rea-
lization) crisis, similarly to the former seri-
ous recessions. Over-production, however, 
does not only mean the over-production of 
goods, although it is also present in the cur-
rent depression (car industry, electronics, 
building material industry, metal proces-
sing, etc.). Over-production refers to capi-
tal in general, independent of its concrete 
form (money, security, goods or producer). 
And, as it has already been mentioned, 
owing to the information revolution, the 
production of surplus stock is not typical 
any more, but the accumulation of surplus 
and unused production capacities (waiting 
for better times).   
The present crisis “plays the same role” 
as the former ones: liquidation of capital 
surpluses and of economic disproportions, 
rehabilitation of the demand and supply 
balance allowing the start of a rise and the 
growth in the profit rate by the introduction 
of new techniques.
Many simplifying views of the present cri-
sis have been born. These disregard the les-
sons of the epochal economy historic ana-
lyses as well as the peculiarities of today’s 
capitalism and its depressions. (One of the 
most simplifying ones was the one given 
high publicity in the Hungarian media 
saying that the reason of the crises is that 
bankers are replaced after some time, and 
the new ones do not know the mistakes 
made earlier.) We can understand the nu-
ances of today’s global recession in case 
we consider, in addition to the general phe-
nomena presented above, the peculiarities 
of the current capitalism, as well.
The pecularities of the present 
crisis
So the current global crisis possesses some 
important characteristics originating in 
the peculiarities of transnational capi-
talism (summarized above) and playing 
influence on the future. According to my 
opinion, these are as follows. 
1. Globalization played an outstanding role 
in the evolution of tensions and dispropor-
tions as well as in their accumulation: the 
internationalization of the economic pro-
cesses, the new wave of capital concen-
tration, the sharpening of global market 
competition, the neoliberal world order 
and the rolling of the global disproportions 
and tensions mentioned above – all these 
owe to the development of technological 
possibilities (the revolution in info-com-
munication and transportation). 
2. The tensions and disproportions in tra-
de, payment, capital flow, finances, debts 
and production capacities are much bigger 
than they were during the former crises. 
Thus – as it is provable by statistical data – 
the evolution of the crisis meant the start of 
draining national and global tensions that 
exceeded even those having accumulated 
prior to the Great Depression of 1929-33.
3. This time the depression definitely set 
out from the capitalist centres, however, 
the rising countries increasingly building 
in the world economy and the under-de-
veloped countries are very much involved, 
as well (through e.g. capital withdrawal, 
the narrowing of export possibilities, the 
working capital flow and the reduction of 
supports). 
4. The decisive element of the evolution 
of this serious situation was the differing 
company interests of the transnational 
companies and the big investment corpo-
rations which were a lot less limited by 
governmental economic politics and the 
national borders than they had been in the 
times of the so-called welfare-state con-
tribution capitalism. The neoliberal game 
rules (e.g. in the WTO) and the principles 
of the Washington Consensus were prac-
tically created by the representatives of 
the TNCs and the Trilateral Commission 
(and were then turned into practice by in-
ternational organizations like the WTO, 
the World Bank Group and others). Despi-
te the warnings, the activity of the TNCs 
and the investor-venture companies were 
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not regulated in order to ease the global 
tensions (e.g. the reform bringing a stricter 
control of the money markets – the intro-
duction of the “new financial architecture”, 
which had been promised to be done during 
the crises of 1997 and 98 – failed, the Tobin 
tax aiming at braking speculation was not 
introduced, the crediting-saving rules were 
made looser, and the interests were redu-
ced to an irrationally low level, especially 
in the USA). So responsibility – as it could 
be clearly seen in the irresponsible real es-
tate crediting practice – basically burdens 
the investment corporations, the banks, the 
TNCs and the governmental economic po-
litics representing their interests. 
5. The highly extended range of the glo-
bal competition of the labour force, which 
atomized and (through the fear of capital 
withdrawal) weakened the workers’ posi-
tions and the representation of their social 
interests, is an important characteristic. 
Nevertheless, the trade union movement 
(Greece, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
France, etc.) and the voice of the Social 
World Forum (Belem, 2009) strengthened 
as the crisis expanded. The developing 
countries, too, are expressing their inte-
rests at the international consultations (e.g. 
the WTO meeting at Doha or the G20 at 
Davos, 2009).  Still, especially in Eastern 
Europe but elsewhere, too, demagogic, xe-
nophobe and racist extreme rightist inter-
pretations are gaining ground which may 
lead to serious consequences (neo-Weima-
rian situation).  
6. Seeing the deepness of the depression 
today, it is clear that the neoliberal idea of 
the self-governing market has at least been 
seriously leaked even if not yet sunk. 
7. The size of the tensions and the devalu-
ation of the economic doctrines of this era 
show that this is a node crisis again. Af-
ter the crisis ends, an at least partially new 
economic-social world order, a new model 
of capitalism will evolve. 
8. I lay great stress on and deeply analyze 
the fact that, especially in the central coun-
tries, the evolving crisis is dealt with in a 
very differing way as compared to that in 
1929-33.   
In 1929-33 – still in the spirit of the liberal 
doctrines excluding intervention – capital 
loss was let loose, and protectionism be-
came dominant. The value of the capital 
mountains fell to one tenth, the debts – the 
international debts, too – disappeared, they 
were written off, production slumped into 
a deep abyss, and unemployment grew to 
five times as much. 
In opposition to this, today the developed 
industrial countries are trying to lessen the 
devastating impacts of the crisis by internal 
cash generation, capital injections, gua-
ranties, the assuming of doubtful demands, 
nationalization and economy incentive pro-
grams (the total amount of these is between 
USD 10 and 20 thousand billion). This is 
a double-edged weapon, a trap situation! 
In case the surplus (virtual) funds and the 
surplus production capitals – or a part of 
them – are saved, and the US remains al-
lowed to grow its domestic consumption 
from external resources, the economic rise 
may start again without the (total) restora-
tion of the equilibrium. Capital loss is, of 
course, serious even now (only at the ex-
changes and the housing markets it amoun-
ted to app. USD 40-45 thousand billion, 
and virtual values uncovered with com-
modity values or realias and equal in value 
to two thirds of the global GDP “disap-
peared”), still it is possible that the banks’ 
and customers’ financial means, which 
can be considered over-accumulated, and 
a part of the production-service capacities 
will, with more or less losses, be rescued 
before the equilibrium gets restored, and 
the macro-economic disproportions remain 
existing at a certain level. In this case, glo-
bal capitalism will go on rolling forward 
the problems that have accumulated over 
the previous 30 years, and as a result of 
this the next economic cycle may be relati-
vely short, and the chance of the evolution 
of a new deep depression remains on the 
stage. The new good conjuncture period 
will again –at least partially – be a story of 
problem rolling. 
And in case the governmental rescue po-
licy is not applied, the consequences might 
even be heavier: the total collapse of the 
global capital system and production, the 
termination of international payments, thus 
the victory of protectionism, the writing off 
of all types of debt, the disappearance of 
the ten and hundred millions of jobs, a two 
figure fall in the GDPs, and the bursting 
appearance of the social tensions. So we 
would face a total disruption similar to 
that in 1929-33. And the deep crisis leads, 
according to the historic experience – to-
wards the rise of the extreme right, fascism 
(we are experiencing that in Eastern Eu-
rope) and wars.
There is one more important remark to be 
made here: the developed countries make 
the governmental Keynesian intervention 
steps possible primarily for themselves. 
(As it has already been mentioned, over the 
previous years the West, and especially the 
USA, applied the neoliberal principles a 
lot less strictly than they expected their ap-
plication of other countries.) The demand 
incentive, internal cash generating, capa-
city and work place creating, sometimes 
nationalizing economic policy increasing 
the state incomes in the middle run are usu-
ally realized by the most developed coun-
tries, even at the expense of increasing the 
state budget deficit or the state debt. (The 
state budget balance deficit of the USA will 
amount to 13 percent of the GDP in 2009, 
that of Great Britain is probably similar, 
and the most of the developed European 
countries’ deficit will exceed the 3 percent 
Maastricht threshold. So in order to restore 
the equilibrium the most developed coun-
tries – at least some of them – are esca-
ping forward. It is the most developed ones 
who divert from the neoliberal ideas, while 
they account the less developed ones for 
the principles of the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus in an almost unchanged way 
(e.g. in turn for debt management). They 
expect policy of restrictions of the indeb-
ted poor and less developed countries even 
if the level of their state debt is not higher 
as compared to the GDP than that of many 
developed countries. This is a double scale 
– originating in naked economic interests 
–, and expresses the one-sided economic-
market-power interests of the developed 
countries and the crediting banks. Libera-
lism-neoliberalism is the ideology of the 
strong and the interests of subordination 
– we have known this since the second 
part of the 19th century, from Friedrich 
List, a famous economist of the then rising 
Germany. 
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The probable course of the 
crisis
According to the historic comparative 
analysis, in the cases of the global growth 
crises, which were accompanied by finan-
cial depression and were at the same time 
strongly synchronized, recession lasted for 
almost two years in average, and the GDP 
decreased by almost 5 percent during this 
period. Then came a stagnation or light 
conjuncture period of almost the same 
length in the course of which the GDP 
grew by only 2.8 percent. The rapid rise 
started only subsequent to these two pha-
ses, that is 3.5 years after the growth crisis 
had started. However, Europe is usually 
1.5-2 years late in following the American 
uptrend. And it must also be emphasized 
that the total stabilization of the financial 
sector demanded 7(!) years in average. 
In the present recession we must consi-
der two contradictory facts. On one hand, 
the recent crisis is deeper, however, the 
Keynesian anti-cyclic money injection 
economic policy may prevent its further 
deepening and protraction on the other.  
In the Institute for World Economics of the 
HAS we have drawn up three scenarios. 
1. In the basic variant we postulate the fact 
that the course of the crisis will be simi-
lar to the – mentioned – tendencies of the 
previous decades’ bigger recessions. Thus 
in the USA and the non-European rising 
countries the economy stabilizes from the 
spring of 2010 (from 2011 in Europe) and 
a rapid uptrend may start from the summer 
or autumn of 2012 (from the end of 2013 
in Europe). 2. According to the optimistic 
prognosis, after the stagnation-like state 
in 2010, 2011 will bring along a rapid up-
raise. In this case, the European Union is 
likely to follow the US’s uptrend from the 
end of 2012, but consolidation and a slow 
growth may start already in 2011. How-
ever, this scenario makes it quite probable 
that the next expansion period will shorten 
to 4-7 years. 3. According to the pessimis-
tic variant, at least one of the triad of the 
developed countries will face economic 
collapse (a decline in the GDP exceeding 
10 per cent), or the Japanese type of the 
lost decade syndrome appears. 
It is, however, to be feared that this conso-
lidation is temporary, and the procession 
line of the crisis will take up a W form, 
so there may come another slump period. 
This is not at all impossible according to 
the experiences gained during the Great 
Depression in ’29-33, since the indicators 
of the New York Stock Exchange rose at 
a level exceeding 20 percent three times 
which were followed by falls in each case. 
Of course, we do not consider this possibi-
lity only owing to the historic antecedents 
but because real risk factors originating 
in the present crisis situation exist.  These 
are: the still existing surplus production 
capacities; the demand (export and domes-
tic market) limits; the deflation danger, at 
least in 2009, and its impact on the pro-
fits; the probable bankruptcy of a part of 
the consumers’ and companies’ debts; the 
failure of the clearing of the bank portfo-
lios and so the possible further difficulties 
of the global banks, state indebtedness, 
and the narrowing of the possibilities of 
financing the latter. Nouriel Roubini, the 
lecturer of the New York University ha-
ving become an economist star because of 
his prediction of the world economic crisis, 
has come to the same conclusions (Roubini 
2009).  
Models of the future
As it has already been mentioned, the pre-
sent crisis is not merely financial, nor only 
over-production, but a kind of node crisis 
of global capitalism. Thus after the crisis 
finishes, its operational method must surely 
change. The extent of this change is not yet 
clear at all. Professor Lesley C. Thurow 
was right when saying that capitalism used 
to change owing to big depressions or peo-
ples’ movements (Thurow 1995., pp. 310-
311). The very weak trade union and wor-
kers’ movement will – probably – not play 
a strong effect, although the deepening of 
the crisis may bring about surprising deve-
lopments. It is rather the economic pressu-
res that will influence the socio-economic 
model evolving just after the crisis ends.   
1. In case the present crisis does not dee-
pen, because the bubble gets rescued and 
partially repumped, the model to come will 
probably be an altered neoliberal model. 
It will be a subdued neoliberal model in 
which the financial flows, the banks, the 
investor and hedge companies and the cre-
dit rating institutions will be controlled and 
regulated more strictly than they are today, 
and the financial control authorities will be 
strengthened. The G20 decided to do so 
at their London meeting in April 2009. It 
is primarily the uprising BRIC countries 
(Brasilia, Russia, India and China) and per-
haps Southern Africa, the developing coun-
tries in general, that will have an increasing 
impact at the international institutions and 
organizations, but all this can not mean that 
their capability of interest enforcement will 
basically be strengthened. Probably, the 
state role played in economy organization 
and economy incentives will grow in the 
centres. However, the peripheries will still 
be forced (by various conditions) to con-
duct neoliberal policies. 
2. In case of the considerable deepening of 
the present crisis, a real economic collapse, 
a model leaning to Keynesism is likely to 
come. The operational method of capi-
talism would change at the international 
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level, as well. In this model the interna-
tional financial bubble would more con-
sciously be tried to be kept between limits, 
or perhaps even terminated. The multila-
teral institutions would be reformed, the 
state debts written off in a rather wide 
range, the development state would be gi-
ven legitimacy, anti-cyclic state economic 
policy would be allowed everywhere in the 
world, the global coordination of economic 
political activity would strengthen, the en-
vironmental aspects could come forward, 
and some kind of a change of political or-
der would also take place. While the first, 
neoliberal model fits into a US-directed 
unilateral world, this latter one wants a 
multipolar world.   
3. And there is a third model which may 
only become possible in the long run, as 
a result of the societal crises probably fol-
lowing the present depression: the social/
socialist/sustainable model. Everyone can 
use the most beloved of the three words. 
This model will place, in opposition to the 
principle of individual responsibility, the 
creation and warranting of general em-
ployment and the individual and collective 
“social and economic rights” (creation of 
high numbers of work places, societal mi-
nimal wages, the right for housing, medical 
care, etc.), as well as strict environmental 
protection, including the spread and trac-
tion role of the green technologies. In this 
model democracy allowed by economic 
safety, the direct and indirect democracy 
practiced by each member of the societies 
continuously, that is the democracy of the 
global world order will come which means 
the placement of the majority’s interest into 
the foreground. This model lets much more 
space for community property forms than 
the one today even if the multi-sectorality 
of properties remains – more or less – exis-
ting. This is, however, a long-term vision.  
Today, in the political dimension, we must 
even fear that, in case the crisis deepens, 
and in case unemployment keeps growing 
in the following 18-24 months, the dark 
clouds of rightist autocracy shouting for 
“order” will gather, as it is usual in chaotic 
crisis situations. 
The historic past teaches us that these are 
the sketch lines of the alternatives we are 
facing. Of course, many variants of these 
models may evolve. And in addition, 
models do not usually occur in clear forms, 
they overlap or dissolve into each other.          
(Written mid 2009)
References:
Annamária Artner (2006): Globalization 
from below. Oppressed groups – rebelli-
ous movements. (Globalizáció alulnézet-
ben. Elnyomott csoportok – lázadó moz-
galmak.) Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó, 279 
p.
Bank for International Settlements:  http://
www.bis.org/statistics/index.htm
“Do not wait for a rise before 2012” (“2012 
előtt ne számítsunk fellendülésre”) (2009): 
HVG No. 04., jan. 24, 8 p.
Péter Farkas (2002): The globalization and 
its threats. The disorders of the world eco-
nomy and the economic theories. (A globa-
lizáció és fenyegetései. A világgazdaság és 
a gazdaságelméletek zavarai.) Budapest, 
Aula Kiadó, 283 p.
Ervin Rozsnyai (1994): The traps of histo-
ry: was it fateful? (A történelem kelepcéi: 
végzetszerű volt-e ami történt?) Budapest, 
Z books, private publication, 106 p.
Ervin Rozsnyai (2002): The epochal chan-
ges of imperialism. (Az imperializmus 
korszakváltásai.) Budapest, privat publi-
cation, 191 p.
OECD online: http://stats.oecd.org/
WBOS/index.aspx
Nouriel Roubini (2009):  “The risks of a 
double-dip, W-shaped recession may be 
growing”  Tajpej Times,  Jun 21. 
Erzsébet Szalai (2006): New capitalism 
and what may come … (Az újkapitalizmus 
és ami utána jöhet …) Új Mandátum Kö-
nyvkiadó ÚMK, 165 p.
Tamás Szentes, (2009): Who, what and 
why is in a crisis? A critique of the simpli-
fying views and aspects. (Ki, mi és miért 
van válságban? A leegyszerűsítő nézetek 
és szemléletmód kritikája.) Napvilág Ki-
adó, 232 p.
Lester C. Thurow (1995): The Future of 
Capitalism. How Today’s Economic For-
ces Shape Tomorrow’s World. Penguin 
Books USA Inc., 385 p.   
“World Development Indicators” (2001-
től 2008-ig): The World Bank, Washing-
ton DC.
                                                                     
